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NOTE 
LET'S ALL GO TO THE MOVIES, 
AND PUT AN END TO DISABILITY 
DISCRIMINATION: 
OREGON PARALYZED VETERANS 
OF AMERICA V. REGAL CINEMAS, 
INC. REQUIRES COMPARABLE 
VIEWING ANGLES FOR 
WHEELCHAIR SEATING 
INTRODUCTION 
Imagine for a moment that it is a Friday night and you 
and a friend decide to see the hottest new movie. You arrive at 
the state-of-the-art theater, purchase your tickets, some pop-
corn and a drink. You then head inside the theater to find a 
seat. As the two of you walk in, you realize that the place is 
packed. Disappointment washes over your face as you reluc-
tantly notice that the only seats left are right in the front row. 
So, you sit down, crane your neck back to see the whole screen, 
and try to focus on the flashing advertisements soliciting the 
anxious theater patrons. The excitement that initially led you 
to the movie theater in the first place has all but dissipated as 
you realize that you will be in this position for the next couple 
of hours. To compensate, you slouch in your seat and try to 
make the best of it. What if you couldn't improve your vision 
by slouching in your seat? What if every time you went to see a 
movie, this was where you would be forced to sit? To disabled 
1 
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moviegoers who are in wheelchairs, this is not a meaningless 
hypothetical, but harsh reality.l 
In the mid-1990s, designs for movie theaters began imple-
menting stadium-style seating.2 A stadium-style theater dif-
fers in many ways from the traditional incline or sloped-
auditorium design.3 Stadium-style theaters more closely re-
semble the design and seating configuration of a sports sta-
dium or arena that provides stepped-seating rising at a slope 
greater than five percent.4 Like a stadium, each step contains 
a row of seats, and the steps ascend "all the way to the back 
(top) of the auditorium."5 Unlike the traditional design, in sta-
dium-style theaters the entrance is typically at the front of the 
auditorium (bottom of the steps) rather than at the rear (top of 
the steps).6 The main purpose behind this newer elevated-
seating configuration of stadium-style theaters is to combat the 
traditional line-of-sight problems that result from the custom-
ary inclined-theater design, i.e., the frustration and dissatisfac-
tion felt by shorter individuals when taller individuals sit in 
front of them.7 The stadium-style design purports to offer a 
heightened movie-watching experience with unobstructed 
views of the screen.S Since the stadium riser section of the 
theater is not wheelchair-accessible, wheelchair-bound patrons 
are forced to sit in the front row and thereby placed at a view-
ing disadvantage.9 
1 See generally Or. Paralyzed Veterans of Am. v. Regal Cinemas, Inc., 339 F.3d 
1126 (9th Cir. 2003), petition for cert. filed, 72 U.S.L.W. 3310 (U.S. Oct. 27, 2003) (No. 
03·641); Lara v. Cinemark USA, Inc., 207 F.3d 783 (5th Cir. 2000); United States v. 
Hoyts Cinemas Corp., 256 F. Supp. 2d 73 (D. Mass. 2003); Meineker v. Hoyts Cinemas 
Corp., No. 02-9034, 2003 WL 21510423 (2nd Cir. July 1, 2003). 
2 Or. Paralyzed Veterans of Am. v. Regal Cinemas, Inc., 339 F.3d 1126, 1132 
(9th Cir. 2003), petition for cert. filed, 72 U.S.L.W. 3310 (U.S. Oct. 27, 2003) (No. 03-
641) [hereinafter Regal Cinemas 1I]. See also, Scott Williams, Movie Seating Options 
Called Lacking For Wheelchair Users, Milwaukee Journal Sentinel, Sept. 30, 2003, 
available at http://www.jsonline.com/news/wauk/sep03/173588.asp (last visited Feb. 15, 
2004). 
3 Lara v. Cinemark USA, Inc., No. EP-97-CA-502-H, 1998 WL 1048497, at *1 
(W.D.Tex. Aug. 21, 1998) [hereinafter Lara I). 
• Lara v. Cinemark USA, Inc., 207 F.3d 783, 785 (5th Cir. 2000) [hereinafter 
Laram. 
5 Lara I, 1998 WL 1048497, at *1. 
6Id. 
7 Lara II, 207 F.3d at 785. 
8 Regal Cinemas II, 339 F.3d at 1127. 
9Id. 
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The disadvantage wheelchair-bound patrons experience 
due to the stadium-style theater design is physical discomfort. lo 
Since wheelchair-bound patrons are generally forced to sit in 
the front rows of movie theaters, disabled patrons must stretch 
their necks back into an uncomfortable position just to view the 
screen.ll AB a result of sitting in these positions for an ex-
tended period of time, these patrons experience dizziness, nau-
sea, headaches, and blurred vision. 12 Disabled patrons claim 
they are the targets of unlawful discrimination as a result of 
being forced into these less advantageous seats. 13 
In an effort to alleviate discrimination of this sort against 
individuals with disabilities, Congress passed the Americans 
with Disabilities Act (hereinafter" ADA").14 Title III of the ADA 
prohibits disability-based discrimination in public accommoda-
tions, such as movie theaters.15 To ensure that all individuals 
equally enjoy the movie-watching experience, disabled patrons 
must be afforded "lines of sight comparable" to those offered to 
non -disabled moviegoers.16 
Several suits have arisen attacking the stadium-style 
theater design as discriminatory against wheelchair-bound pa-
trons due to non-compliance with ADA regulations. I? Section 
10 [d. at 1128. 
11 See generally Regal Cinemas II, 339 F.3d 1126; Lara II, 207 F.3d 783; Hoyts 
Cinemas, 256 F. Supp. 2d 73; Meineker, 2003 WL 21510423. This general assertion 
regarding the placement of wheelchair seating at the front of most stadium-style thea-
ters stems from the information set out in the cases discussed in this Note. 
12 Regal Cinemas II, 339 F.3d at 1128. 
13 See Regal Cinemas II, 339 F.3d 1126; Lara II, 207 F.3d 783; Hoyts Cinemas, 
256 F. Supp. 2d 73; United States v. AMC Entertainment, Inc., 232 F. Supp. 2d 1092 
(C.D. Cal. 2002); Meineker, 2003 WL 21510423. 
" 42 U.S.C. § 12101(b)(1) (2000). 
15 42 U.S.C. § 12182(a) (2000). "No individual shall be discriminated against on 
the basis of disability in the full and equal enjoyment of the goods, services, facilities, 
privileges, advantages, or accommodations of any place of public accommodation by 
any person who owns, leases (or leases to), or operates a place of public accommoda-
tion." [d. In relevant part, public accommodations are defined as a motion picture 
house, theater, concert hall, stadium, or other place of exhibition or entertainment. 42 
U.S.C. § 12181(7)(C) (2000). 
16 28 C.F.R. pt. 36, app. A, § 4.33.3 (2003). 
17 See Regal Cinemas II, 339 F.3d 1126; Lara II, 207 F.3d 783; Hoyts Cinemas, 
256 F. Supp. 2d 73; AMC Entertainment, Inc., 232 F. Supp. 2d 1092; Meineker, 2003 
WL 21510423. 
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4.33.3 of the ADA Accessibility Guidelines (hereinafter 
"ADAAG"), states that "[wlheelchair areas shall be an integral 
part of any fIxed seating plan and shall be provided so as to 
provide people with physical disabilities a choice of admission 
prices and lines of sight comparable to those for members of the 
general public."18 Specifically, the issue surrounding these 
suits is the meaning of lines of sight comparable. Advocates for 
the disabled argued that the "lines of sight" language required 
taking into account the viewing angles of patrons.19 A conten-
tion, that if validated, would cause many theaters, undoubt-
edly, to find themselves out of compliance with ADA regula-
tions.20 After all, the viewing-angles disparity is too great to 
ignore.21 On one hand, able-bodied patrons can view a movie 
comfortably from a variety of seats. A majority of these seats 
do not require even the slightest arching of the neck to view the 
screen. Disabled patrons, on the other hand, are forced to sit in 
the front row because most theaters fail to provide alternative 
seating. As a result of such inadequate accommodations, dis-
abled patrons are forced to arch their necks back to view the 
movie, thereby suffering a series of physical discomforts.22 
Recently, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals decided this 
exact issue in favor of disabled moviegoers.23 In Oregon Para-
lyzed Veterans of America v. Regal Cinemas, Inc., the court held 
that viewing angles must be taken into account when assessing 
comparability of lines of sight.24 In doing so, the Ninth Circuit 
created a circuit split with the Fifth Circuit, which decided the 
issue three years before in favor of theater owners.25 In Lara v. 
Cinemark USA, Inc., the Fifth Circuit held that lines of sight 
18 See 28 C.F.R. pt. 36, app. A, § 4.33.3 (2003) (emphasis added). 
1. See generally Regal Cinemas II, 339 F.3d 1126; Lara II, 207 F.3d 783; Hoyts 
Cinemas, 256 F. Supp. 2d 73; Meineker, 2003 WL 21510423. 
20 Regal Cinema 11,339 F.3d at 1134 (Kleinfeld, J., dissenting). 
21 See Regal Cinemas II, 339 F.3d at 1128. 
22 See Id. 
23 See Id. at 1133. 
24 Id. 
2!i See Lara II, 207 F.3d 783. 
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did not encompass viewing angles, and instead required only 
that views to the screen be unobstructed.26 
Although times are changing and technology is advancing 
in more ways than people can keep track of, it is important to 
ensure that these achievements do not come at the expense of 
discrimination. This Note contends that the Ninth Circuit was 
correct in finding that in order to ensure comparable lines of 
sight for disabled and non-disabled patrons, viewing angles 
must be taken into account.27 Part I provides a general back-
ground of Title III of the ADA, and specifically addresses sec-
tion 4.33.3 of the ADAAG and its history.28 Additionally, Part I 
examines the Fifth Circuit's decision in Lara, as it played a 
major role in the outcome of the Ninth Circuit's decision in Re-
gal.29 Part II analyzes both the majority and the dissenting 
opinions offered in Regal.30 Part III defends the majority opin-
ion in Regal through a critique of the Regal dissent.31 Part IV 
discusses other cases arguing the same issues, taking the Fifth 
Circuit's decision in Lara into consideration.32 Lastly, Part V 
concludes that the Ninth Circuit was correct in ruling that a 
valid interpretation of section 4.33.3 of the ADAAG includes a 
viewing-angle consideration.33 
26 Id. at 789. Recently, the Sixth Circuit had a chance to deal with the issue as 
well. See United States v. Cinemark USA, Inc., 348 F.3d 569 (6th Cir. 2003). In that 
case, the Sixth Circuit like the Ninth Circuit disagreed with the reasoning of the Lara 
court, and concluded that the "lines of sight comparable" language "clearly requires 
more points of similarity than merely an unobstructed view." Id. at 579. Since, the 
Sixth Circuit is in accord with the Ninth Circuit, the Sixth Circuit's decision will not be 
discussed in this Note. 
Z1 Regal CiTU!mas II, 339 F.3d at 1133. 
2B See infra notes 34-48 and accompanying text. 
29 See infra notes 49-72 and accompanying text. 
30 See infra notes 73-137 and accompanying text. 
" See infra notes 138-183 and accompanying text. 
32 See infra notes 184-226 and accompanying text. 
33 See infra notes 227-229 and accompanying text. 
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I. BACKGROUND 
A. THE AMERICANS WITH DISABILITIES ACT 
Congress passed the ADA recognizing that disabled indi-
viduals continuously suffer from discrimination, isolation, seg-
regation, and a lack of physical access to various services and 
facilities.34 In order to preserve the civil rights and liberties of 
handicapped and disabled people, the ADA provides "a clear 
and comprehensive national mandate for the elimination of 
discrimination against individuals with disabilities."35 Title III 
of the ADA prohibits disability-based discrimination in public 
accommodations, and generally requires that public accommo-
dations and commercial facilities designed and constructed for 
first occupancy after January 26, 1993, be "readily accessible to 
and usable by individuals with disabilities. "36 
In 1991, Congress prompted the Department of Justice 
(hereinafter "DOJ") to issue a set of regulations providing sub-
stantive standards applicable to facilities covered under Title 
III.37 Consistent with a Congressional mandate, the DOJ 
adopted a set of guidelines promulgated by the Architectural 
and Transportation Barriers Compliance Board (hereinafter 
"Access Board").38 Aside from advising and providing technical 
assistance to individuals or entities with rights and duties un-
der Titles II and III of the ADA, the Access Board is a body 
charged with "establish [ing] and maintain [ing] minimum 
guidelines and requirements for the standards issued pursuant 
to" Title III of the ADA.39 Together the Access Board and DOJ 
issued the ADAAG.40 Within the stadium-style movie theater 
context, the relevant provision of the ADAAG in dispute is sec-
34 42 u.s.c. § 12101(a)(1)-(3),(5) (2000). 
35 42 U.S.C. § 12101(b)(1) (2000). 
'" 42 u.s.c. § 12183(a)(1) (2000). The ADA specifically states that public accom· 
modations include movie theaters. 42 U.S.C. § 12181(7)(C) (2000). 
37 42 U.S.C. § 12186(b) (2000). 
38 42 U.S.C. § 12186(c) (2000). See also 42 U.S.C. § 12204 (2000). "The Access 
Board is an independent Federal agency devoted to accessibility for people with dis-
abilities. It operates with about 30 staff and a governing board of representatives from 
Federal departments and public members appointed by the President." The Access 
Board website, available at http://www.access-board.gov/indexes/aboutindex.htm (last 
visited Feb. 15, 2004). 
39 29 U.S.C. § 792(b)(2), (3)(B) (2000). 
40 28 C.F.R. § 36.406(a) (2003); see also 28 C.F.R. pt. 36, app. A. (2003). 
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tion 4.33.3, which deals with the placement of wheelchair seat-
ing in assembly areas.4l Section 4.33.3 states in relevant part, 
"[w]heelchair areas shall be an integral part of any fixed seat-
ing plan and shall be provided so as to provide people with 
physical disabilities a choice of admission prices and lines of 
sight comparable to those for members of the general public."42 
At issue in the cases discussed in this Note is the meaning 
of the regulatory language "lines of sight comparable" con-
tained in section 4.33.3.43 The DOJ interpreted the "lines of 
sight" language to require that viewing angles for patrons in 
the wheelchair seating of stadium-style theaters be comparable 
(similar or equivalent) to the viewing angles offered to the gen-
eral public.44 The DOJ publicly announced this interpretation 
in several amicus briefs in attempts to settle particular cases.45 
The Access Board acknowledged the DOJ's new interpretation 
of section 4.33.3 in its proposed rules.46 The Access Board 
" 28 C.F.R. pt. 36, app. A, § 4.33.3 (2003). 
" Id. (emphasis added). Section 4.33.3 further states: 
They shall adjoin an accessible route that also serves as a means of egress in case of 
emergency. At least one companion fixed seat shall be provided next to each wheel-
chair seating area. When the seating capacity exceeds 300, wheelchair spaces shall be 
provided in more than one location. Readily removable seats may be installed in 
wheelchair spaces when the spaces are not required to accommodate wheelchair users. 
EXCEPTION: Accessible viewing positions may be clustered for bleachers, balconies, 
and other areas having sight lines that require slopes of greater than 5 percent. 
Equivalent accessible viewing positions may be located on levels having accessible 
egress.Id. 
" Id . 
.. Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Appellants and Urg-
ing Reversal at 10, Or. Paralyzed Veterans of Am. v. Regal Cinemas, Inc., 339 F.3d 
1126 (9th Cir. 2003) (No. 01-35554) [hereinafter Appellants Brief Urging Reversall . 
.. See Appellants Brief Urging Reversal at 10; Brief for the United States as 
Amicus Curiae in Support of Appellees Urging Affirmance at 14, Lara v. Cinemark 
USA, Inc., 207 F.3d 783 (5th Cir. 2000) (No. 99-50204) [hereinafter Appellees Brief 
Urging Affirmancel. An amicus brief is a brief written by an amicus curiae, which is 
Latin for "friend of the court." Amicus curiae is ural person who is not a party to a 
lawsuit but who petitions the court or is requested by the court to file a brief in the 
action because that person has a strong interest in the subject matter." BLACK'S LAw 
DICTIONARY 66 (7th ed. Abridged 2000) . 
.. See ADDAG for Buildings and Facilities, 64 Fed. Reg. 62,248, 62,278 (Access 
Board Nov. 16, 1999). 
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stated that it would consider requirements in the final rule 
that would harmonize the DOJ's interpretation of the regula-
tion as it applied to stadium-style movie theaters.47 The rule, 
however, has not been amended to incorporate the DOJ's con-
cerns.4S 
B. COMPARABLE LINES OF SIGHT REQUIRES ONLY AN 
UNOBSTRUCTED VIEW 
Although the stadium-style theater design was in use for 
only a couple of years, disabled moviegoers in Texas were the 
first to realize the new design's failure to offer them equal en-
joyment of the movie-watching experience.49 The first case to 
challenge the stadium-style design was Lara v. Cinemark USA, 
Inc. 50 In December 1997, a group of disabled persons and advo-
cacy groups brought a civil action in the United States District 
Court for the Western District of Texas against the owner of 
Tinseltown USA, a movie theater complex. 51 In Lara, the 
plaintiffs alleged that the twenty-screen stadium-style movie 
theater complex did not comply with ADA standards.52 More-
over, the plaintiffs claimed that eighteen Tinseltown theaters 
were in violation of 42 U.S.C. section 12182(a) and section 
4.33.3 of the ADAAG because the wheelchair seating provided 
., Id. [The] DOJ has asserted in attempting to settle particular cases that 
wheelchair seating locations must: (1) Be placed within the stadium-style section of the 
theater, rather than on a sloped floor or other area within the auditorium where tiers 
or risers have not been used to improve viewing angles; (2) provide viewing angles that 
are equivalent to or better than the viewing angles ... provided by 50 percent of the 
seats in the auditorium, counting all seats of any type sold in that auditorium; and (3) 
provide a view of the screen, in terms of lack of obstruction (e.g., a clear view over the 
heads of other patrons), that is in the top 50 percent of all seats of any type sold in the 
auditorium. The Board is considering whether to include specific requirements in the 
final rule that are consistent with DOJ's interpretation of 4.33.3 to stadium-style movie 
theaters_ Id . 
.. See 28 C.F.R. pt. 36, app. A, § 4.33.3 (2003) . 
• 9 See Lara I, 1998 WI. 1048497, at *1. 
50 Lara II, 207 F.3d 783. 
51 See Lara I, 1998 WI. 1048497, at *1. The plaintiffs in this action are seven 
individuals consisting of Jose G. Lara, E.J. Lozano, Alfred Juarez, G. Tim Hervey, Earl 
L. Harbeck, Luis Enrique Chew, and Myra Murillo, and two advocacy groups for people 
with disabilities consisting of the Volar Center for Independent Living and Desert 
Adapt. Id. The plaintiffs sought damages and injunctive and declarative relief. Id. 
52Id. 
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in the front of the auditorium did not offer comparable lines of 
sight to those provided to non-disabled theater patrons.53 
In a case of first impression, the district court in Lara dis-
cussed the application of 42 U.S.C. section 12182(a) and section 
4.33.3 to a stadium-style theater. 54 Like most stadium-style 
theaters, Tinseltown's theaters provide one entrance located at 
the front of the theater, directly in front of the movie screen.55 
Accordingly, Tinseltown's designated wheelchair row was lo-
cated on the same level as the entrance, in the front row of the 
overall seating.56 The plaintiffs complained "that viewing the 
movie screen from the level of the entrance is very awkward 
and uncomfortable, because it is too close to the screen and too 
far below its [the screen's] level."57 The precarious placement of 
the wheelchair row forced wheelchair-bound patrons to raise 
their eyes and crane their necks at extremely uncomfortable 
angles just to watch the movie.58 
Plaintiffs interpreted the word "comparable," as used in 
section 4.33.3 of the ADAAG, to mean that seating for wheel-
chair-bound patrons must provide those patrons with lines of 
sight similar or equivalent to those available to non-disabled 
patrons, assuring that disabled moviegoers are not relegated to 
the worst seats in the auditorium.59 The district court agreed, 
holding that Tinseltown theaters did not afford patrons with 
comparable lines of sight.60 The court stated that as a result of 
their discomfort, wheelchair-bound patrons are "denied the full 
53 [d. at *2. The design of the other two theaters are not an issue in this case, 
since both have a second entrance at the back of the auditorium that is wheelchair 
accessible by means of an elevator, and allows for a wheelchair row located at the rear 
of the auditorium. [d. at *1, n.I-2. 
M [d. at *2. 
55 See supra note 6 and accompanying text. 
56 Lara [, 1998 WL 1048497, at *1. 
57 [d. 
58 [d. at *2. "The average viewing angle from this row is above thirty-five de-
grees, which the Plaintiffs' expert witness has properly described as 'well into the dis-
comfort zone'." [d . 
.. [d. Indeed, comparable is defined as "capable of or suitable for comparison; 
equivalent, similar." WEBSTER'S NINTH NEW COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 267 (1984). 
60 Id. 
9
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and equal enjoyment of the movie going experience in these 
eighteen theaters" as compared to the average patron.61 The 
court concluded that the defendant's theaters violated the ADA 
and the ADAAG, and were subsequently ordered to modify the 
eighteen theaters accordingly.62 
The victory, however, for these wheelchair-bound movie 
buffs was short-lived. In April 2000, the United States Court of 
Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reversed the district court's deci-
sion.63 In its opinion, the court of appeals stated that until now, 
no court questioned whether section 4.33.3' required compara-
ble viewing angles for wheelchair-bound patrons as compared 
to the general public.64 Although the DOJ filed two amicus 
briefs outlining their interpretation of section 4.33.3,65 the court 
found that the DOJ and Access Board did not explicitly con-
sider issues surrounding viewing angles prior to enacting sec-
tion 4.33.3, and that the Access Board only recently considered 
revising the section to include such requirements.66 Further, 
the court looked to the meaning of "lines of sight" as inter-
61Id. 
62 Lara v. Cinemark USA, Inc., No. EP-97-CA-502-H, 1999 WL 305108, at *2 
(W.D.Tex. Feb. 4, 1999). Plaintiffs motion for summary judgment was granted. Lara 1, 
1998 WL 1048497, at *3. Plaintiffs Jose G. Lara, Alfredo Juarez, Earl L. Harbeck, Luis 
Enrique Chew, and Myra Murillo were each awarded $100 under the Texas Human 
Resources Code, §121.004(b). Lara v. Cinemark USA, Inc., No. EP-97-CA-502-H, 1999 
WL 305108, at *3 (W.D.Tex. Feb. 4, 1999). Plaintiffs G. Tim Hervey (not wheelchair-
bound) and E.J. Lozano (blind) were awarded no damages, since it is not clear they 
were affected by the defendant's noncompliance. Id. Plaintiff Margarita Lightbourne-
Harbeck is not mentioned in the result. Id. Further, all plaintiffs were entitled to 
attorney's fees and the court directed plaintiffs to file the requisite motions within 
fourteen days from the entry of the judgment. Id. Modifications included moving the 
wheelchair seating farther away from the screen and higher off the floor, as well as 
lowering the height of the screen by approximately one foot. Lara 11,207 F.3d at 785. 
Although directing these modifications to be made, it was not explicitly stated how 
wheelchair-bound patrons would get to these newly provided spaces located further 
from the screen and higher from the ground. 
63 Lara 11, 207 F.3d 783. 
MId. at 788. However, the court did note that whether lines of sight for wheel-
chair seating needed to be unobstructed by standing spectators under section 4.33.3 
was an issue that several courts had already undertaken. Id. 
65 See Appellees Brief Urging Affirmance at 14. In Lara, the DOJ submitted one 
amicus brief at the district court level and one at the appellate level. Id. Although not 
published, "the Civil Rights Division of the United States Department of Justice was 
allowed by the Court to file a brief as amicus curiae." Lara 1, 1998 WL 1048497, at *1. 
66 Lara 11, 207 F.3d at 788. The court further noted that "while the DOJ's 1994 
Technical Assistance Manual explicitly requires theaters to provide 'lines of sight over 
spectators who stand,' the manual does not address problems involving viewing an-
gles." Id. 
10
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preted in other contexts and concluded that the phrase meant 
"unobstructed view."67 
Writing for the Fifth Circuit, Judge W. Eugene Davis held 
that section 4.33.3 does not impose a requirement affording 
disabled patrons the same viewing angles available to non-
disabled patrons.68 Instead, Judge Davis stated that the regu-
lations mandated only that the patrons' view of the screen be 
unobstructed.69 According to the court, "[t]o impose a viewing 
angle requirement at this juncture would require district 
courts to interpret the ADA based upon the subjective and un-
doubtedly diverse preferences of disabled moviegoers."70 Since 
Tinseltown's theaters provided the wheelchair-bound patrons 
unobstructed lines of sight, the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals 
found that defendants were in compliance with ADA regula-
tions. 71 On October 16, 2000, the United States Supreme Court 
denied the plaintiffs' petition for writ of certiorari.72 By this 
time, however, a case in an Oregon district court was already 
under way presenting the same issue that the Fifth Circuit de-
cided in Lara. 
67 [d. at 788-89. To interpret the language "lines of sight," the court used the 
following federal regulations: "See, e.g., 47 C.F.R. § 73.685 (2000) (FCC regulation 
requiring that antennae have line of sight, without obstruction, of the communities 
that they serve); 46 C.F.R. § 13.103 (2000) (defining direct supervision as having line of 
sight of the person being supervised); 36 C.F.R. § 2.18 (2000) (forbidding people under 
age 16 from operating snowmobiles unless they are "within line of sight" of a reason-
able person over age 21)." [d. 
68 Lara II, 207 F.3d at 789. 
69 [d. 
70 [d. 
71 [d. 
72 Lara II, 207 F.3d 783, cert. denied, 531 U.S. 944 (2000). 
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II. COMPARABLE LINES OF SIGHT REQUIRE COMPARABLE 
VIEWING ANGLES 
In April 2000, the Oregon Paralyzed Veterans of America, 
along with Kathy Stewmon, Tina Smith, and Kathy Braddy, 
brought three claims in the United States District Court for the 
District of Oregon, against Regal Cinemas, Inc.73 In Oregon 
Paralyzed Veterans of America v. Regal Cinemas, Inc.,74 plain-
tiffs asserted that the wheelchair seat locations within six of 
Regal's theaters failed to comply with ADA requirements.75 
Once again, the meaning of "lines of sight comparable" was at 
the heart of this lawsuit, because similar to Tinseltown's thea-
ters in Lara, Regal's theaters employed stadium-style seating 
configurations.76 The plaintiffs in Regal argued that "these 
words impose a viewing angle standard such that wheelchair 
seating areas must be placed in the stadium seating portion of 
theaters and not just in the front rows of a theater that provide 
inferior and uncomfortable viewing angles. "77 
The plaintiffs adopted the DOJ's position concerning sec-
tion 4.33.3 of the ADAAG as offered during Lara and outlined 
in their amicus briefs.78 Despite the Fifth Circuit's rejection of 
the DOJ's new interpretation, the plaintiffs asked the Oregon 
73 Or. Paralyzed Veterans of Am. v. Regal Cinemas, Inc., 142 F. Supp. 2d. 1293, 
1294 (D. Or. 2001) [hereinafter Regal Cinemas 1]. Eastgate Theatre Inc., d/b/a Act III 
Theaters, Inc was also named as a defendant in the action, however, since the district 
court referred to the defendants collectively as "Regal", this Note will do the same. [d. 
74 Regal Cinemas II, 339 F.3d 1126. 
75 Regal Cinemas [, 142 F. Supp. 2d. at 1294. "The plaintiffs also claimed that 
the seating plans violate Oregon's public accommodations statute, Or.Rev.Stat. § 
659.425(3), and claimed negligence in the design, construction, and operation of the 
stadium-riser theaters. They sought declaratory and injunctive relief, compensatory 
and punitive damages under the Oregon statute, and damages for negligence (in an 
amount to be proved at trial), in addition to attorneys' fees and costs." Regal Cinemas 
II, 339 F.3d at 1127. After the district court granted summary judgment to the defen-
dants on all three claims, plaintiffs only appealed the ADA claim. [d. Accordingly, this 
Note will only discuss the ADA claim. 
76 Regal Cinemas [,142 F. Supp. 2d. at 1294-1295. 
77 [d. at 1295. Accordingly, both parties filed motions for summary judgment. [d. 
at 1294. 
78 [d. at 1296. The new interpretation of section 4.33.3 "required the following in 
stadium-style theaters: 'wheelchair locations must be provided lines of sight in the 
stadium seating seats within the range of viewing angles as those offered to most of the 
general public in the stadium style seats, adjusted for seat tilt.'" [d. 
12
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court to adopt the DOJ's litigating position in Lara as its latest 
interpretation of section 4.33.3.79 
Although the Oregon district court admitted it was 
tempted to follow the reasoning of the Texas district court in 
Lara, making its decision based on the plain meaning of the 
regulation,so the court ultimately followed the Fifth Circuit's 
reasoning. SI Not only was the district court persuaded by the 
regulation's history and "the context in which it was promul-
gated," but also by the fact that stadium-style theater design 
did not come into effect until 1995, four years after the DOJ 
adopted section 4.33.3.S2 The district court did not defer to the 
DOJ's interpretation of section 4.33.3 and further stated that, 
"it would be unreasonable and inconsistent with the history of 
Section 4.33.3 (including statements by the Access Board) to 
interpret it to require stadium-style theaters to provide wheel-
chair-bound moviegoers with comparable viewing angles. "S3 
The district court was not confident that an amicus brief was 
an appropriate way to announce an agency's interpretation of a 
rule.84 The court further noted that establishing appropriate 
79 [d. at 1296. 
so [d. at 1296-97, quoting Lara I, 1998 WL 1048497, at *2. Plain meaning was a 
term coined by the district court in Regal, which described the district court's analysis 
in Lara, interpreting the language of section 4.33.3 "in their common, ordinary, Eng-
lish language, dictionary meaning." Id. Plain meaning is additionally defined as the 
meaning attributed to a document (usually by a court) based on a commonsense read-
ing of the words, giving them their ordinary sense and without reference to extrinsic 
indication's of the author's intent. BLACK'S LAw DICTIONARY 796 (7th ed. Abridged 
2000). 
8' Regal Cinemas 1,142 F. Supp. 2d. at 1297. 
82 [d. Of great importance to the Oregon district court was the fact that in 1994, 
the DOJ stated in its Technical Assistance Manual the requirement that certain audi-
toriums must provide unobstructed lines of sight over patrons who stand, but men-
tioned nothing about viewing angles. Id. Since § 4.33.3 was advanced in 1991 and 
stadium-style theaters didn't come about until 1995, the court felt that was dispositive 
of the fact that the regulation could not and did not speak to the issue of lines of sight 
in stadium-style movie theaters. Id. The fact that the Access Board did not consider 
such concepts as viewing angles in stadium-style seating until 1999, provided more 
strength for the court's argument in siding with the Fifth Circuit. Id. 
83 [d. at 1297-98 . 
.. [d. at 1297. 
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viewing-angle standards is a task better left to "notice and 
comment rule making rather than through an interpretive 
rule."85 Accordingly, summary judgment was granted in favor 
of defendants.86 
A. THE REGAL MAJORITY 
On appeal, Judge Betty Fletcher, writing for the majority 
of the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals, disagreed with the dis-
trict court and reversed its findings.87 First, the majority dis-
agreed with the Fifth Circuit's reasoning (so heavily relied 
upon by the district court), which claimed that to analyze com-
parability in such terms would require delving into the subjec-
tive seating preferences of moviegoers.88 The Ninth Circuit re-
lied on the engineering guidelines of the Society of Motion Pic-
ture and Television Engineers (hereinafter "SMPTE").89 The 
SMPTE established exact points at which most viewers 
reached a point of physical discomfort.90 Based on the SMPTE 
guidelines, the Ninth Circuit reasoned that the physical dis-
.. [d. at 1298 n.2. The full quotation from the district court is as follows: "[Tlhe 
vague viewing angle standards cited in the record cry out for a detailed methodology 
that would best be developed and imposed through notice and comment rulemaking 
rather than through an interpretive rule." [d. The court did not elaborate on this 
point, however the court was most likely concerned that this type of change was better 
suited for the legislation to handle. [d. 
86 [d. at 1298. Summary judgment was also granted against the plaintiffs on 
each of their other two claims. Regal Cinemas 11,339 F.3d at 1127. 
87 [d. at 1127. The plaintiffs only appealed the district court's ruling on the ADA 
claim. [d. Further, only the individual plaintiffs filed the appeal. [d. at 1127 n.1. 
Oregon Paralyzed Veterans of America did not join in the appeal. [d. 
88 Regal Cinemas 11,339 F.3d at 1132 n.7. 
89 [d. at 1128. "SMPl'E was founded in 1916 to advance theory and development 
in the motion imaging field. Today, SMPl'E publishes ANSI-approved Standards, 
Recommended Practices, and Engineering Guidelines, along with the highly regarded 
SMPTE Journal and its peer-reviewed technical papers." Society of Motion Picture and 
Television Engineers, available at http://www.smpte.org/membership/ (last visited Feb. 
15, 2004). SMPTE goals include developing industry standards, communicating the 
latest developments in technology, enhancing education, and promoting networking 
and interaction. [d. 
90 SMPTE: Engineering Guideline: Design of Effective Cine Theaters, 5 (1994). 
"For most viewers, physical discomfort occurs when the vertical viewing angle to the 
top of the screen exceeds 35 [degrees], and when the horizontal line of sight measured 
between a perpendicular to [the viewer'sl seat and the centerline of the screen exceeds 
15 [degrees]." [d. 
14
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comfort suffered by disabled patrons could be determined 
through objective, rather than subjective criteria.91 The court 
stated that although able-bodied patrons are free to choose 
from a wide range of "objectively comfortable" seating within 
stadium-style theaters, wheelchair-bound patrons do not share 
this freedom and are forced to sit in "objectively uncomfortable" 
seating in the first few rows.92 Further, the court stated that 
evidence showed the viewing angle in the defendants' theaters 
is on average seven degrees higher than the 35 degree limit 
classified by the SMPTE as "uncomfortable."93 
Second, the Ninth Circuit criticized the lower court's fail-
ure to defer to the new interpretation of section 4.33.3 offered 
by the DOJ.94 The court stated that an agency's interpretation 
of its own regulations should be given substantial deference.95 
This is most important when the regulatory language is am-
biguous and the agency's interpretation is reasonable.96 Unlike 
the district court, the Ninth Circuit found the DOJ's interpre-
tation to be reasonable based on the definition of "lines of 
sight,"97 and its applicability in the movie theater context.98 
The Ninth Circuit rejected the Lara court's legislative and ad-
ministrative analysis of section 4.33.3.99 The Ninth Circuit did 
not find the legislative and administrative history of section 
4.33.3 dispositive either way, so as to compel an interpretation 
of "lines of sight comparable" to include viewing angles, or 
9' Regal Cinemas II, 339 F.3d at 1132 n.7. 
92 [d. The court went on to say that these seats are objectively uncomfortable for 
all patrons, yet the discomfort is "exacerbated for wheelchair-bound viewers relative to 
able-bodied viewers sitting in the same row. [d. 
93 [d . 
.. [d. at 1131. 
.. [d., citing Thomas Jefferson University v. Shalala, 512 U.S. 504, 512 (1994) . 
.. Regal Cinemas II, 339 F.3d at 1131, quoting Martin v. Occupational Safety & 
Health Review Comm'n, 499 U.S. 144, 150-51 (1991). "When the meaning of regulatory 
language is ambiguous, the agency's interpretation of the regulation controls 'so long as 
it is "reasonable," that is, so long as the interpretation sensibly conforms to the purpose 
and wording of the regulations.'" [d. 
97 [d. Definition of "lines of sight" in relevant part, found to consist of "a line 
from an observer's eye to a distant point (as on the celestial sphere) toward which he is 
looking or directing an observing instrument." WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL 
DICTONARY 1316 (1993) . 
.. Regal Cinemas II, 339 F.3d at 1131. "In the context of a movie theater, this 
means a line extending from the viewer's eye to the points on the screen where the film 
is projected, taking account the angle from the viewer's eye to those points." [d . 
.. [d. at 1132. 
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not. 100 Instead, the Ninth Circuit declared that the issue is not 
whether the DOJ contemplated "viewing-angle issues in the 
context of stadium-style seating at the time when [section] 
4.33.3 was promulgated ... [but] whether a broadly-drafted 
regulation -- with a broad purpose -- may be applied to a par-
ticular factual scenario not expressly anticipated at the time 
the regulation was promulgated."lOl Relying on the United 
States Supreme Court's approval of this approach as to unam-
biguous statutory text,102 the Ninth Circuit decided to treat 
regulations as analogous.l03 
Third, the Ninth Circuit found the district court's hesita-
tion towards the DOJ's interpretation, due to the fact it came 
about through an amicus brief, to be unfounded.104 After all, 
"[a]n agency's interpretation of one of its own rules, including 
an interpretation expressed in an amicus brief, is controlling 
unless plainly erroneous or inconsistent with the rule. "105 Fi-
nally, as additional support for rejecting the reasoning in Lara, 
the court cited United States v. Hoyts Cinemas Corporation/06 
which offered similar disapproval of the Fifth Circuit's reason-
ing.107 
In the end, the Ninth Circuit returned to the language of 
the ADA and found it inconceivable that the objectively uncom-
fortable seating in question provided "full and equal enjoy-
ment" of the movie-going experience by disabled patrons as it 
did for the general public. lOS Non-disabled patrons are not sub-
ject to experiencing dizziness, nausea, headaches, or blurred 
100 [d. at 1132-33. 
101 [d. at 1133. 
102 See Pennsylvania Dep't of Corr. v. Yeskey, 524 U.S. 206, 212 (1998) ("the fact 
that a statute can be applied in situations not expressly anticipated by Congress does 
not demonstrate ambiguity. It demonstrates breadth." (internal quotation marks omit-
ted) (citing S.P.R.L. v. Imrex Co., 473 U.S. 479, 499 (1985))). 
103 Regal Cinemas II, 339 F.3d at 1133. 
104 [d. at 1131 n.6. 
106 See Navellier v. Sletten, 262 F.3d 923,945 (9th Cir. 2001) (emphasis in text). 
106 Hayts Cinemas, 256 F. Supp. 2d. at 88 ("This Court now rules (notwithstand-
ing the contrary reasoning in the Lara decision) that the comparable 'lines of sight' 
requirement of Section 4.33.3 means that viewing angles must be taken into account.") 
For further discussion of this case see infra notes 186-204 and accompanying text. 
107 Regal Cinemas II, 339 F.3d at 1133 n.8. 
lOB [d. at 1133. 
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vision as wheelchair-bound patrons are. 109 In view of this, the 
Ninth Circuit held that the DOJ's interpretation was "valid 
and entitled to deference."uo Specifically, section 4.33.3 re-
quired that the viewing angles for wheelchair-bound patrons 
must be "within the range of angles offered to the general pub-
lic in the stadium-style seats."lll The district court's decision 
was reversed and remanded with instructions to enter sum-
mary judgment in favor of the plaintiffs.u2 
B. THE REGAL DISSENT 
Judge Kleinfeld's dissent disagreed with the majority for 
several reasons. ll3 First, the dissent agreed with the Oregon 
district court that the majority's decision will bring about a 
substantial change that would be better handled through an 
appropriate rule- making process rather than a retroactive ju-
dicial one. U4 Second, other requirements present in the regula-
tion limit the compliance with the majority's rule. us Third, the 
dissent disagreed with the majority's definition of "compara-
ble. "U6 Fourth, since a wheelchair section in the front of the 
theater was not prohibited before stadium seating, viewing the 
same regulation to prohibit the wheelchair placement after the 
implementation of stadium seating is illogical,l17 Lastly, the 
majority decision creates a conflict with the Fifth Circuit and 
provides uncertainty for theater owners as to their legal obliga-
tions.u8 
Initially, Judge Kleinfeld appeared extremely troubled by 
the majority usurping the responsibility to solve a problem that 
he felt would be more aptly dealt with through the executive 
branch, and which indeed was already recognized as an issue 
109 See supra note 12 and accompanying text. 
110 Regal Cinemas II, 339 F.3d at 1133. 
111 Id. 
112 Id. 
113 See Regal Cinemas II, 339 F.3d at 1134 (Kleinfeld, J., dissenting). 
114 Id. 
115 Id. at 1135 (Kleinfeld, J., dissenting). 
1I6Id. 
117 Id. at 1137 (Kleinfeld, J., dissenting). 
118 Id. at 1133 (Kleinfeld, J., dissenting). 
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by the Access Board as listed in their Notice of Proposed Rule-
making in 1999.119 The dissent noted that the Access Board is 
"proposing to amend the guidelines to include specific technical 
provisions" governing sight lines.12o The dissent further urged 
that "[r]egulating movie theater architecture retroactively by 
vague judicial fiat is unjust"121 especially given the precision 
with which these regulations are written.122 
According to the dissent, the majority ignored other re-
quirements within the regulation that "give context to the lines 
of sight requirement, such as the access and emergency exit 
requirements. "123 These requirements are present to ensure 
that disabled patrons are not isolated in a "wheelchair ghetto" 
from the other patrons and that they are able to sit next to 
their friends and family.124 In addition, these requirements al-
low disabled patrons to get in and out of the theater, both with 
ease and in cases of emergency. 125 The dissent offers these 
other requirements as reasons wheelchair seating is located in 
the front, flat portion of the theater.126 
Like the Oregon district court and the Fifth Circuit, the 
dissent poses the question, "comparable to what?"127 The dis-
sent retreats to the subjective rationale of those earlier deci-
sions. 128 Although conceding that "as a matter of geometry a 
line of sight will not be identical to any particular other seat," 
the dissent claims that the wheelchair seating is "comparable" 
to the seats immediately adjacent to them. 129 Judge Kleinfeld 
119 See ADDAG for Buildings and Facilities, 64 Fed. Reg. at 62,278. 
120 See [d. at 62,277. 
121 Regal Cinemas II, 339 F.3d at 1134 (Kleinfeld, J., dissenting). 
122 [d. For comparable specificity in the C.F.R. regarding wheelchair accessibility 
guidelines, see 28 C.F.R. pt. 36, app. A, § 4.31.8 (2003) (telephone cord length must be 
at least 29 in.); see also 28 C.F.R. pt. 36, app. A, § 4.32.3 (2003) (wheelchair seating 
knee clearance at tables and counters must be "at least 27 in (685 mm) high, 30 in (760 
mm) wide, and 19 in (485 mm) deep."). 
123 Regal Cinemas II, 339 F.3d at 1135 (Kleinfeld, J., dissenting). 
124 [d. See infra notes 149-160 and accompanying text for a discussion of the term 
"wheelchair ghetto." 
125 Regal Cinemas II, 339 F.3d at 1135 (Kleinfeld, J., dissenting). 
126 [d. The other requirements of § 4.33.3 are "that wheelchair areas be 'an inte-
gral part' of the fixed seating plan, that they 'adjoin an accessible route' that also 
serves as an emergency exit, that they be adjacent to 'companion' seating, and that 
they have 'lines of sight comparable to those for members of the general public.'" [d., 
quoting 28 C.F.R. pt. 36, app. A, § 4.33.3 (2003). 
127 Regal Cinemas II, 339 F.3d at 1135 (Kleinfeld, J., dissenting). 
128 [d. at 1136 (Kleinfeld, J., dissenting). 
129 [d. 
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articulated that "comparable" means "similar or equivalent to," 
and does not mean "better than" as the DOJ asserted.130 Judge 
Kleinfeld expressed confusion over the DOJ's interpretation of 
comparable as meaning ''better than the viewing angles ... pro-
vided by 50 percent of the seats."131 
Further, the dissent fails to see how a regulation can ad-
dress stadium-style seating, when the majority conceded that it 
was a "factual scenario not expressly anticipated at the time 
the regulation was promulgated."132 Judge Kleinfeld goes on to 
state that since "regulations did not prohibit a wheelchair sec-
tion in the front of the theater before [stadium seating], it is 
impossible to justify a construction that the very same regula-
tion prohibits the very same wheelchair seating, with identical 
angles of view, after stadium seating came into use."133 
The dissent is dissatisfied with the circuit split.134 The dis-
sent ultimately criticized the majority's opinion for vagueness 
and for failing to offer guidance to theater owners regarding 
compliance with the law.135 In Judge Kleinfeld's own words, 
"[t]he least the majority could do in its retroactive legislative 
effort is offer a holding that can be translated into a floor-
plan."136 Judge Kleinfeld postulates that he might be able to 
create a scheme that would satisfy the majority decision, how-
ever, he is uncertain that the design would be accepted by the 
majority or even that it would be the least expensive means of 
compliance.137 
'30 [d. at 1135 (Kleinfeld, J., dissenting), citing THE AMERICAN HERITAGE 
DICTIONARY 300 (2d ed. 1982). 
031 See ADDAG for Buildings and Facilities, 64 Fed. Reg. at 62,278. 
032 Regal Cinemas II, 339 F.3d at 1137 (Kleinfeld, J., dissenting), citing the major-
ityopinion at 1133. 
133 Regal Cinemas II, 339 F.3d at 1137 (Kleinfeld, J., dissenting). 
134 [d. at 1136 (Kleinfeld, J., dissenting) ("A purportedly uniform federal regula-
tion now means something different in the Ninth Circuit from what it means in the 
Fifth."). 
135 [d. at 1136 (Kleinfeld, J., dissenting). 
136 [d. at 1137 (Kleinfeld, J., dissenting). 
037 [d. at 1134 (Kleinfeld, J., dissenting). 
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III. A CRITIQUE OF REGAL 
By adopting the DOJ's interpretation of section 4.33.3, the 
Ninth Circuit in Regal advanced the goals of Title III of the 
ADA.13S Due to the decision in Regal, viewing angles for wheel-
chair seating must be provided within the range of angles of-
fered to the general public in stadium-style seating.139 Mter all, 
ensuring that people with disabilities have access to "the full 
and equal enjoyment of the goods, services, facilities, privi-
leges, advantages, or accommodations of any place of public 
accommodation" is the central goal of Title 111.140 It would be 
difficult to argue that a disabled moviegoer, someone already 
subject to physical infirmities, enjoys the overall movie-going 
experience as much as the average person, especially if his or 
her seat is unfavorably placed. Although the dissent criticizes 
several deficiencies within the majority opinion, most of Judge 
Kleinfeld's concerns are either misdirected or too narrowly con-
strued. 
A. THE MAJORITY As RULEMAKER 
The dissent began by stating that the majority's approach 
to this whole situation was unjust in light of the fact that the 
Access Board is considering creating new regulations dealing 
with stadium-style movie theaters.141 While this may be a valid 
concern, how long should disabled moviegoers be forced to wait 
for a change? In response to the DOJ's interpretation of section 
4.33.3 and the frequent placement of wheelchair seating in the 
front rows, the Access Board published a Notice of Proposed 
Rulemaking in 1999 that would consider new regulations for 
stadium-style movie theaters.142 Although the Access Board 
noted the importance of providing wheelchair patrons better 
138 Id. at 1133 (majority opinion). 
139 Id. 
140 42 U.S.C. § 12182(a) (2000). 
141 Regal Cinemas II, 339 F.3d at 1133-34 (Kleinfeld, J., dissenting). 
1<2 ADDAG for Buildings and Facilities, 64 Fed. Reg. at 62,278. 
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lines of sight, they also stated that according to design profes-
sionals, measuring compliance in regards to such concerns 
might prove difficult and uncertain. That was four years ago.143 
It took only two years from the advent of stadium-style 
theaters for a discrimination claim to be filed by the plaintiffs 
in Lara. 144 And, it took two years from that point for the Access 
Board even to recognize the DOJ's position regarding compar-
ing lines of sightY5 Now, four years later, the Access Board 
has done nothing about this concern. Yet, the dissent main-
tains that the Access Board is best suited to handle this situa-
tion in the most efficient manner.146 If and when the Access 
Board adopts a regulation resembling the DOJ's position, the 
requirements under the regulation "will be clear, precise, and 
prospective. "147 In light of the Access Board's lack of diligence 
in addressing this issue however, the majority did the right 
thing and achieved the same purpose by expressly not turning 
its back on movie theater discrimination. 
The dissent should not have criticized the majority for in-
volving themselves in an area of concern that needed attention. 
In addition, the Access Board should look at the majority's de-
cision not as an infringement on their autonomy, but instead as 
a call to arms. The Access Board should use the general guide-
lines and concerns that the majority laid out in the Regal deci-
sion, giving great attention to the DOJ's interpretation, and 
create the new regulations for stadium-style movie theaters 
that it said it would. Further, the Access Board's uncertainty 
in measuring compliance with lines-of-sight regulations is no 
longer a concern, given the facts surrounding comfortable view-
ing angles offered in the SMPTE engineering guidelines.148 
"" Id. at 62,277. 
,« See Lara I, 1998 WL 1048497, at *1. 
'45 ADDAG for Buildings and Facilities, 64 Fed. Reg. at 62,278. 
'46 Regal Cinemas II, 339 F.3d at 1134 (Kleinfeld, J., dissenting). 
'47 Id. 
'48 SMPTE: Engineering Guideline: Design of Effective Cine Theaters, 5 (1994). 
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B. WHEELCHAIR GHETTO 
Judge Kleinfeld recognized the majority's concern against 
having a "wheelchair ghetto" located in one portion of the thea-
ter, offering disadvantageous lines of sight compared to those of 
other patrons.149 Despite this valid concern, Judge Kleinfeld 
discounted this as a chimera/50 asserting that the regulation 
already addresses this issue.151 While this mayor may not be 
true, this assertion does not determine whether the language, 
"lines of sight," encompasses viewing angles. In fact, the dis-
sent concludes that the majority should not be concerned with 
a wheelchair ghetto since the regulation prohibits "a wheel-
chair ghetto out of the way, behind a post, or off to the side."152 
Not only does this assume that the words, "lines of sight," ex-
clude viewing angles, but also assumes that the only way to 
have a wheelchair ghetto is to segregate disabled people into 
their own section, or to provide them seats in which their view 
is obstructed. 
The fact that wheelchair seating is placed in the front row, 
technically mingled with the general public and not separated, 
does not eviscerate the notion of a wheelchair ghetto. In the 
1950's, African-Americans were forced to sit in the back of pub-
lic buses and yield the front of the bus to whites.153 Although 
the back of a bus is not technically separate from the front, we 
would be hard pressed to say that this disparate treatment did 
not amount to a form of discrimination. The flagrant discrimi-
149 Regal Cinemas II, 339 F.3d at 1135 (Kleinfeld, J., dissenting). The term 
"wheelchair ghetto" is only employed by the dissent and not the majority decision. Id. 
The term "wheelchair ghetto" is meant to describe an area of a theater containing sub-
standard seating as a result of the section's "sight lines [that are) worse than those 
[offered to) the other patrons." Id. 
ISO A chimera is defined as "an illusion or fabrication of the mind; an unrealizable 
dream." WEBSTER'S NINTH NEW COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 233 (1984). 
151 Regal Cinemas II, 339 F.3d at 1135 (Kleinfeld, J., dissenting). Judge Kleinfeld 
interpreted the language of § 4.33.3 of the ADAAG to mean that in those theaters 
where the seating capacity does not exceed 300, wheelchair seating may be grouped 
together rather than distributed throughout the theater, as long as the wheelchair 
seating is not separated from the general seating and the lines of sight are not sub· 
stantially different from those offered to the general public. Id. 
152Id. 
153 Time 100: Heroes & Icons Rosa Parks, available at 
http://www.time.com/timeitimel00iheroesiprofileiparks01.html (last visited Feb. 15, 
2004). 
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nation that Rosa Parksi54 and the civil rights movement helped 
eliminate and that which the plaintiffs in Regal fought against 
are comparable. i55 
Wheelchair seating that is provided in the first row of a 
movie theater, while not physically separated from the general 
seating, constitutes a form of discrimination. i56 Compared with 
that of the general public, the wheelchair seating area is not 
provided comparable lines of sight due to inferior viewing an-
gles. 
Judge Kleinfeld discounts the majority's view of a wheel-
chair ghetto before even attempting to attack the notion that 
comparable viewing angles must be read within the "lines of 
sight" language. Instead, Judge Kleinfeld justified the place-
ment of the wheelchair seating provided in the flat, front por-
tion of the theater due to theater owners' need to comply with 
other requirements, such as those for access and emergency 
exits. i57 The dissent asserts that the majority disregards these 
necessary concerns, and which are sure to complicate any con-
struction plan. i5s The majority does not, however, ignore these 
requirements under the regulation, but instead gives the lines-
of-sight requirement equal weight. Compliance with all the 
1" [d. Rosa Parks was born on February 4, 1913 in Tuskegee, Alabama. [d. Mrs. 
Parks, a black woman, became part of the civil rights movement through one simple 
act. [d. On December 1, 1955, Mrs. Parks got on a bus to go home in Montgomery, 
AL., and sat down in the first row of the bus designated for blacks. [d. But as the bus 
became more crowded, Mrs. Parks was ordered to give up her seat to a white woman. 
[d. She refused. [d. Although Mrs. Parks was arrested, her choice to remain seated 
led to the disintegration of segregation in the South. [d. 
155 The Access Board website, available at http://www.access-
board.gov/aboutlADA.htm (last visited Feb. 15, 2004). Indeed, the ADA was even mod-
eled after historic laws preventing race and gender based discrimination. [d. 
156 Indep. Living Res. v. Or. Arena Corp., 982 F.Supp. 698, 712 (D. Or. 1997). A 
wheelchair ghetto must be thought of in terms of desirability. [d. The court stated in 
Independent Living Resources v. Oregon Arena Corp. that an arena owner can't create 
a wheelchair ghetto that consigns wheelchair-bound patrons to the least desirable 
seats in the venue. [d. 
157 Regal Cinemas II, 339 F.3d at 1135 (Kleinfeld, J., dissenting). 
158 [d. In addressing the importance ofthese other concerns which theater owners 
must comply with, the dissent states: "The 'integral part' requirement prohibits a sepa-
rate and noncontiguous wheelchair ghetto, the companion seating provision prohibits 
separation of the disabled from friends and family, and the access route provision as-
sures that the disabled can get in and out of the movie theater conveniently and safely 
(which may require that they be in the flat area in front)." [d. For further discussion 
of the integration requirement and its advantages in solving the sight line problems in 
question, see Civil Rights -- Americans With Disabilities Act - Ninth Circuit Holds That 
Movie Theaters Must Provide Comparable Viewing Angles For Patrons in Wheelchairs, 
117 Harv. L. Rev. 727 (2003). 
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requirements under section 4.33.3 is no doubt an architectural 
and construction nightmare, however, this is no reason to ig-
nore one of the provisions merely for simplicity and ease. More 
important, it is unnecessary to ignore the lines-of-sight re-
quirement. 
The dissent's argument that wheelchair seating is placed 
in the front of the theater in order to comply with all of the re-
quirements under section 4.33.3 is unjustified. In Lara, there 
were two Tinseltown theaters whose design was not contested, 
which provided wheelchair seating in the back of the audito-
rium as well as in the front, and was accessible by means of an 
elevator. 159 Similarly, one of Regal's theaters had four audito-
riums that provided wheelchair-accessible seating in the sta-
dium riser section.160 Assuming that those theaters complied 
with the other requirements of section 4.33.3, providing wheel-
chair seating more options than the front row while maintain-
ing compliance with the regulation as a whole is possible. 
C. COMPARABLE TO WHAT? 
Judge Kleinfeld correctly stated that the meaning of "com-
parable" as it relates to the "lines of sight" language in the 
regulation is the heart of this case.l6l Judge Kleinfeld defined 
"comparable" as "similar or equivalent" and disagrees with the 
DOJ's interpretation that "comparable" means "equivalent to or 
better than fifty percent of the seats. "162 The dissent poses the 
question, "comparable to what?"I63 Judge Kleinfeld opined that 
reading "comparable" to mean "similar or equivalent to" the 
viewing angles provided for non-wheelchair seating is more 
natural than defining the word to mean "better than" the non-
wheelchair seating. l64 While one might agree with Judge Klein-
feld's interpretation of the meaning of "comparable" as a status 
of equivalence instead of superiority, the means with which 
Judge Kleinfeld rationalized and implemented his interpreta-
tion is flawed. 
159 Lara I, 1998 WL 1048497, at *1 n.1-2. 
160 Regal Cinemas II, 339 F.3d at 1128 n.3. 
,., Id. at 1135 (Kleinfeld, J., dissenting). 
''''' Id., citing The American Heritage Dictionary 300 (2d ed. 1982). 
163 Regal Cinemas II, 339 F.3d at 1135 (Kleinfeld, J., dissenting). 
164 Id. 
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Judge Kleinfeld pointed out that viewing angles differ with 
every seat in the auditorium, and that there is no possible way 
for a wheelchair-bound patron's line of sight to be comparable 
to that of all these seats.165 Further, Judge Kleinfeld agreed 
with the Fifth Circuit and stated that seating preferences in 
movie theaters are highly subjective and vary with each indi-
vidual. 166 In light of this subjectivity, Judge Kleinfeld stated 
that the wheelchair seating in the front of the theater is com-
parable to the non-wheelchair seating also in the front of the 
theater, which is preferred by the patrons who like to sit up 
front. 167 According to the dissent, this meets the regulation's 
requirements.16s Judge Kleinfeld fails to view seating in the 
first few rows of a movie theater as undesirable, stating that 
"[i]f the seats up front, or in the back, were uniformly consid-
ered undesirable, theaters would have to charge less for them. 
They don't."169 While the front row seating in a movie theater 
may not be uniformly considered undesirable by moviegoers 
everywhere, it is evident that the seats are clearly not the best 
in the auditorium and not favored by most movie patrons. 
Anyone who has gone to see a popular movie on opening 
night knows that right before the movie sells out, the seats in 
the first few rows are always the last to be filled.l7O This is a 
consideration moviegoers take into account when determining 
when they should arrive at a theater. Moviegoers know that 
the longer they delay their arrival, the greater the possibility 
that the preferable seats will already be taken. They know 
165 [d. at 1136 (Kleinfeld, J., dissenting). Kleinfeld notes that to do this would 
require the "scattering of wheelchair seating that the 300·seat provision [of § 4.33.3) 
expressly avoids requiring in small theaters." [d. 
1GS [d. In describing the ways in which the preferences of movie watchers differ, 
Kleinfeld stated the following: "Some people like to sit up front, for maximum size of 
picture and stereo effect of the sound, and to avoid distractions from people in front of 
them. Some people like to sit in back, for the greater height and sense of separation 
from the picture. Some like the aisles, so they can get out easily to go to the bathroom 
or the popcorn stand. Some like the center, so they won't be distracted by the people 
who get up during the movie to go [to) the bathroom or the popcorn stand." [d. 
167 [d. 
168 [d. 
169 [d. 
170 United States v. AMC Entm't, Inc., 232 F. Supp. 2d 1092, 1105 n.15 (C.D. Cal. 
2002). In March 1997, a trial attorney for the DOJ, Joe Russo, gave a presentation to 
theater owners on the requirements of § 4.33.3. [d. at 1105. In regards to front row 
seating, Russo stated in his presentation that "these are not the first seats that go 
when you go to the movies. Nobody runs into the movie theater to see Terminator 200 
and runs to the front seat so they can get neck strain like this." [d. at 1105 n.15. 
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they will be forced to sit closer to the screen than they would 
prefer, resulting in a diminished movie-going experience. Non-
disabled patrons have the ability to improve their seating and 
overall movie-watching experience. In contrast, wheelchair-
bound patrons are confined to a particular location and posi-
tion, unable to improve their overall movie experience. More-
over, wheelchair-bound patrons who are forced to sit in the 
front row have experienced dizziness, nausea, headaches, or 
blurred vision as a result of their wheelchair confinement and 
front-row seating, whereas non-disabled patrons are able to 
avoid against these problems either by reclining or slouching in 
their seats. l7l 
In the end, the dissent's argument, that the wheelchair 
seating provided up front is comparable to the other seating 
provided to the patrons who prefer to sit up front, is unpersua-
sive. The lines of sight provided within these seats are distin-
guishable because non-disabled patrons have the ability to re-
cline and slouch, whereas due to their disability, wheelchair-
bound patrons generally do not share the same flexibility. The 
dissent sidestepped this issue simply by stating that theater 
owners cannot command wheelchair manufacturers to con-
struct wheelchairs with the same reclining tilt as movie theater 
seats enjoy.172 The dissent's reliance on this argument is mis-
placed. Theaters should recognize the limits disabled people 
face and provide wheelchair seating in areas of the theater that 
would not require the patrons to recline or slouch. The regula-
tions should work towards the disabled patrons' benefit and not 
to their detriment. 
The dissent asserts that providing more accommodating 
seating for wheelchair-bound patrons is not within the thea-
ters' control, stating that "[t]hose who use wheelchair spaces in 
a movie theater bring their own chairs."173 While the dissent 
attempts to draw attention to the lack of control a theater has 
over the construction and constraints of a wheelchair, in effect 
Judge Kleinfeld is stating that these individuals are disabled, 
and there is nothing he can do about that.174 This is exactly the 
171 See supra note 92 and accompanying text. 
172 Regal Cinemas II, 339 F.3d at 1137 (Kleinfeld, J., dissenting). 
173 [d. 
174 [d. The dissent stated the following: "The wheelchair manufacturer and pur-
chaser in substantial part control the vertical viewing angle, and the wheelchair space 
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type of discrimination the ADA was created to protect against. 
Unlike Judge Kleinfeld's design, comparability must be inter-
preted in light of the purpose of Title III of the ADA. In accord 
with the DOJ's interpretation, lines of sight should be consid-
ered comparable if they provide disabled persons' equal enjoy-
ment of the benefits of public accommodations, or in this case, 
the movie-watching experience.175 
D. WHEELCHAIR SEATING BEFORE THE STADIUM STYLE 
Judge Kleinfeld pointed out that section 4.33.3 did not ad-
dress the issue or prohibit wheelchair seating in the front row 
of a theater before the advent of stadium-style theaters.176 
Consequently, the court, as Judge Kleinfeld contends, may not 
read into it now as doing such.177 This criticism of the major-
ity's argument, however, ignores the freedoms that the tradi-
tional theater design offered to handicapped patrons. In the 
traditional sloped-theater design, persons in wheelchairs had 
more options. They could either use the handicapped spaces 
provided by the theater, wherever they might be, or they could 
park their chair anywhere along the theater aisle that best 
suited their viewing preference. With the stadium-style thea-
ter design, handicapped patrons lose these options and are 
forced to use only the spaces provided by the theater. 
E. No GUIDANCE TO THEATER OWNERS 
Judge Kleinfeld stated that the main problem with the ma-
jority's decision leaves theater owners unsure of what they 
need to do in order to comply with section 4.33.3 of the 
provided by the movie theater controls the horizontal angle." [d. The gist of Kleinfeld's 
statement is that the movie theaters' control is limited to an extent. [d. While this is, 
of course, true, it is still within the theaters' control to alleviate the concerns and dis-
comforts felt by wheelchair-bound patrons by providing more advantageous seating 
locations. 
175 42 U.S.C. 12182(a) (2000); see also 42 U.S.C. 12182(b)(1)(A)(ii) (2000). In its 
amicus curiae brief, the DOJ asserted, "[tlhe quality of the viewing experience is quite 
relevant to whether there is 'equal enjoyment' of the benefits of a movie theater. A 
wheelchair user who must watch a movie from an extreme angle that causes signifi-
cant discomfort and distortion of the picture has not been afforded 'equal enjoyment' of 
the movie if most other patrons are able to watch the film at more comfortable angles." 
Appellants Brief Urging Reversal at 14. 
176 Regal Cinemas II, 339 F.3d at 1137 (Kleinfeld, J., dissenting). 
177 [d. 
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ADAAG.17S Judge Kleinfeld further stated he would have pre-
ferred a "floorplan" from the majority with which theater own-
ers might better interpret its holding.179 It is important to note 
that throughout his dissent, Judge Kleinfeld criticized the ma-
jority for interfering with the rulemaking process. ISO Yet, the 
Circuit Judge requests more specificity from the court in re-
gards to a movie theater's proper compliance with section 
4.33.3.1S1 According to the dissent, the majority's decision 
leaves thousands of theaters violating section 4.33.3 and must 
begin a reconstruction process with only a vague outline of 
what they need to do in order to comply with the regulation.1s2 
The majority's decision however, does not lack such specificity 
as Judge Kleinfeld asserts. 
Kathleen L. Wilde of the Oregon Advocacy Center in Port-
land, who represented the plaintiffs in Regal, said that the de-
cision requires Regal and other theaters to "retrofit their thea-
ters so that wheelchair seats can be among the stadium style 
seating, which is so highly desired."ls3 Indeed, is this not all 
that is needed? Providing wheelchair seating in the stadium 
section will comply with the majority's decision and provide 
wheelchair patrons lines of sight to the screen that are compa-
rable with those provided to able-bodied patrons. The majority 
decision in Regal, therefore, was indeed sufficient. 
IV. THE HOYTS DECISIONS 
At this time, only the Fifth, Ninth and most recently the 
Sixth Circuit have addressed section 4.33.3 of the ADAAG and 
reached a conclusion as to whether viewing angles should be 
included within the meaning of "lines of sight comparable."l84 
178 [d. at 1134 (Kleinfeld, J., dissenting). 
179 [d. at 1137 (Kleinfeld, J., dissenting). 
ISO [d. 
181 [d. 
182 [d. at 1134 (Kleinfeld, J., dissenting). In Kleinfeld's opinion, "lilt is irresponsi-
ble to impose on a country a decision that will require of an industry so much recon-
struction, without clear guidance on what must be done." [d. 
183 Ragged Edge Online Magazine, Moviegoers in Wheelchairs Win Victory in 
Oregon, available at http://www.ragged-edge-mag.comldrnJ08_03.shtml#591 (last vis-
ited Feb. 15, 2004). See also David Watson, Ninth Circuit Rules: Movie Theaters May 
Not Relegate Wheelchair Patrons to Front, Metropolitan News-Enterprise, available at 
http://www.metnews.comlarticles/oreg081403.htm (last visited Feb. 15, 2004). 
184 See generally Lara II, 207 F.3d 783; Regal Cinemas II, 339 F.3d 1126; United 
States v. Cinemark USA, Inc., 348 F.3d 569 (6th Cir. 2003). 
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Several district courts, however, have grappled with the IS-
sue. 1SS 
A UNITED STATES V. HOYTS CINEMAS CORPORATION 
In 2000, the United States Attorney's Office sued two ma-
jor Massachusetts-based movie-theater chains.ls6 The govern-
ment sued the theater companies in a Massachusetts District 
Court alleging that they designed, built, and operated movie 
theaters that denied equal access to wheelchair users under 
section 303(a)(1) of the ADA, 42 U.S.C. Section 12183(a)(1), and 
of course, Section 4.33.3 of the ADAAG.IS7 In United States u. 
Hoyts Cinemas Corporation,188 the disputed theater designs 
were similar to those in Lara and Regal. The design provided 
wheelchair seating either exclusively in the traditional seating 
section located in front of the stadium section, or, alternatively, 
in the front row of the stadium section on the access-aisle that 
separates the two sections.189 The designs of the theaters, how-
ever, were not the only similarities between Hoyts and Regal. 
185 See Hoyts Cinemas, 256 F. Supp. 2d 73; Meineker, 216 F. Supp. 2d 14; see also 
United States v. AMC Entm't, Inc., 232 F. Supp. 2d 1092 (C.D. Cal. 2002), in which the 
California district court found Lara's reasoning that "lines of sight comparable" require 
only an "unobstructed view," to be unpersuasive. [d. at 1110. AMC noted that "[tlhe 
Fifth Circuit relied on other references in the Code of Federal Regulations to 'lines of 
sight' and concluded that in each instance the reference concerned the presence or 
absence of obstructions." [d. However, AMC failed to see how the regulations which 
dealt with the placement of antennae, what constitutes "direct supervision," and opera-
tion of snowmobiles by juveniles under the age of 16, had any applicability in this in-
stance. [d. The following cases described within this portion of my Note are included 
to offer a perspective on how district courts in other circuits have addressed § 4.33.3 of 
theADAAG. 
186 Federal Judge Rules for Stadium Seating for Wheelchairs, New England News, 
available at http://web1.whdh.comlnewsiarticlesllocallAl11281 Gast visited Feb. 15, 
2004) The two movie theater companies were National Amusements Inc., based in 
Dedham, and Hoyts Cinemas Corp., based in Boston. Id. Both theater companies were 
ranked in 2000 among the ten largest movie theater companies in the country. [d. The 
companies both began constructing stadium-style theaters in 1997. [d. 
1S7 Hoyts Cinemas, 256 F. Supp. 2d at 75. In Hoyts, the government originally 
brought two separate civil actions against each of the theater companies. [d. Since the 
two complaints were virtually identical, the Massachusetts district court consolidated 
the two actions. [d. The complaint set forth two counts. [d. Count I is discussed in 
this Note. Count II is not discussed and was dismissed by the court on August 22, 
2001. [d., see also United States v. Nat'l Amusements, Inc., 180 F. Supp. 2d 251, 262 
(D. Mass. 2001). 
ISS Hoyts Cinemas, 256 F. Supp. 2d 73. 
ISS [d. at 79. A majority of the designs provided wheelchair seating both on the 
access-aisle separating the traditional and stadium-style sections, and in the tradi-
tional section as well. [d. A minority of theaters provided wheelchair seating only in 
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The Hoyts court's decision, mentioned in a footnote by the 
court in Regal, similarly rejected the Fifth Circuit's reasoning 
in Lara. 19o In Hoyts, the government argued that the reasoning 
in Lara and its progeny were flawed for several reasons. l9l 
First, the government contended that the Fifth Circuit was in-
correct in determining that lines of sight were defined only in 
terms of an unobstructed view.192 According to the government, 
the Fifth Circuit offered no factual support from the regula-
tion's language to justify such a ruling. 193 Second, in making a 
historical analysis, the Fifth Circuit relied on Technical Assis-
tance Manuals that were written before the advent of stadium-
style theaters.194 Third, the Fifth Circuit did not defer to the 
DOJ's interpretation of its own regulation.195 Finally, the court 
in Lara selectively limited its analysis to certain portions of the 
regulation in question. 196 As a result, the court ignored the sec-
tions of the proposed regulation that considered viewing angles 
when determining whether lines of sight were comparable.197 
The Hoyts court agreed with the government's arguments 
concerning Lara's interpretation of "lines of sight compara-
ble."198 Hoyts especially disagreed with Lara's reasoning, that 
lines of sight need only provide unobstructed views, given the 
regulation'S express language requiring comparability to those 
the traditional style section. ld. And, a small minority of these designs offered wheel-
chair accessible seating only in the front row ofthe traditional style section. ld. 
190 Regal Cinemas II, 339 F.3d at 1133 n.8. 
191 Hoyts Cinemas, 256 F. Supp. 2d at 84. At the time of this decision, the Ninth 
Circuit Court of Appeals had not yet decided Regal, therefore as Lara's progeny, the 
court lists the Oregon district court decision in Regal, as well as United States v. 
Cinemark U.S.A., Inc., Case No. CIV.A.99-705, slip op. (N.D. Ohio Nov. 19,2001). ld. 
192 Hoyts Cinemas, 256 F. Supp. 2d at 84. 
193 ld. 
194 Id. 
lOSld. 
196 ld. 
197 ld. at 84 n.8. In a footnote, the Hoyts court provided the language of the regu-
lation, which was omitted by the Lara court. Id.The omitted section ofthe regulation 
stated as follows: "As stadium-style theaters are currently designed, patrons using 
wheelchair spaces are often relegated to a few rows of each auditorium, in the tradi-
tional sloped floor area near the screen. Due to the size and proximity of the screen, as 
well as other factors related to stadium-style design, patrons using wheelchair spaces 
are required to tilt their heads back at uncomfortable angles and to constantly move 
their heads from side to side to view the screen. They are afforded inferior lines of 
sight to the screen." ld., quoting ADDAG for Buildings and Facilities, 64 Fed. Reg. at 
62,277. 
198 Hoyts Cinemas, 256 F. Supp. 2d at 85. 
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of the general public.199 In the end, the court did not grant the 
retroactive injunctive relief sought by the government.200 In-
stead, Hoyts mandated that relief should be granted only pro-
spectively.201 Despite this, if the theaters were to make any 
changes to their establishments (including construction or re-
furbishment) that required a building permit, the theaters 
would then be required to comply with section 4.33.3 and pro-
vide wheelchair seating in the stadium section.202 In an effort 
to alleviate any confusion, the court explicitly stated that 
"wheelchair seating cannot be located solely in the traditional 
section, nor solely in the access-aisle, nor solely in both the tra-
ditional section and access-aisle" if compliance with section 
4.33.3 of the ADAAG is to be met.203 This decision is pending 
appeal in the First Circuit.204 
B. MEINEKER V. HOYTS CINEMAS CORPORATION 
In 1998, plaintiffs Susan Meineker and Sybil McPherson 
brought a ~uit against Hoyts Cinemas Corporation in the 
United States District Court for the Northern District of New 
York.205 In Meineker v. Hoyts Cinemas Corporation,206 the plain-
tiffs alleged a violation of Title III of the ADA based on the 
wheelchair seating configuration at the defendant's theater, 
located in the Crossgates Mall in Albany, New York.207 Similar 
to the plaintiffs in Lara and Regal, Meineker and McPherson 
are disabled and forced to use wheelchairs.208 Further, each 
reported difficulty viewing the screen from the wheelchair 
seats located in the front of the theater directly under the 
screen, and suffered discomfort from the constant seat-shifting 
and neck-craning required in order to view the movie.209 Due to 
'99 [d. 
200 [d. at 91. 
201 [d. 
202 [d. at 93. 
203 [d. 
204 Hoyts Cinemas, 256 F. Supp. 2d 73, appeal pending, No. 03-1646 (lst Cir. 
argument scheduled for after July 31, 2003). 
205 Meineker, 216 F. Supp. 2d 14. 
206 Id. 
207 [d. at 15. 
208 [d. 
209 [d. The court noted that "[slubsequent to the commencement of this litigation, 
the wheelchair seating was renovated between November 2000 and March 2001. The 
wheelchair seating was relocated to the rear of the floor section behind several rows of 
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the lack of wheelchair seating in the stadium section of the 
theater, the plaintiffs claimed that the wheelchair patrons 
were not offered lines of sight comparable to those provided to 
the general public as section 4.33.3 of the ADAAG requires.21o 
In analyzing the straightforward question surrounding the 
meaning of "lines of sight," the district court in Meineker recog-
nized the decisions of the cases that already dealt with the is-
sue.211 Within these prior rulings, the Meineker court noted 
that the "lines of sight" language does not impose a viewing-
angle requirement, but mandates only an unobstructed view.212 
Nonetheless, the district court held that the language of the 
regulation requires more than just an unobstructed view since 
the word "comparable" provides a qualitative requirement in 
the regulation.213 Indeed, the presence of the word "compara-
ble" requires that the sight line to the screen be "similar" and 
not merely "similarly unobstructed," compared with the sight 
lines offered to the general public.214 
Notwithstanding the court's position that section 4.33.3 
requires more than just an unobstructed view, and disagreeing 
with the Fifth Circuit, the Meineker court held that the viewing 
angles offered to wheelchair-bound patrons were "comparable 
to those afforded to a significant portion of the general pub-
lic. "215 The court reached this conclusion in light of the defen-
dant's renovations to the wheelchair seating area/16 renova-
tions which included moving the wheelchair seating to the rear 
of the floor section, away from the front of the theater where 
plaintiffs were originally forced to sit.217 The court stated that 
if the defendants had not relocated the wheelchair seating at 
general public seating, and as close to the center of the theater as possible." Id. (cita-
tions omitted). This was a critical factor to the court's subsequent decision. 
210 Id. at 16. The plaintiffs argued additionally that the wheelchair seating vio-
lates the ADA since (1) the wheelchair seating is not an integral part of the fixed seat-
ing plan, (2) the theaters provide no wheelchair access to the stadium seating area, and 
(3) the wheelchair seating is "separate and unequal." Id. 
211 Id. at 17. At the time of the district court's decision, the cases available were 
the Fifth Circuit decision in Lara, the Oregon district court decision in Regal, as well 
as United States v. Cinemark U.S.A., Inc., Case No. CIV.A.99-705, slip op. (N.D. Ohio 
Nov. 19, 2001). Id. 
212 Meineker, 216 F. Supp. 2d at 18. 
213Id. 
214 Id. 
215 Id. 
216Id. 
217 See supra note 206. 
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the Crossgates theaters, "it would unquestionably have been in 
violation of the ADA."21B Less than one year later, the district 
court's decision was vacated by the United States Court of Ap-
peals for the Second Circuit, and sent back to the lower courts 
on remand.219 
On appeal, the plaintiffs maintained that the defendant 
was not in compliance with section 4.33.3 due to its failure to 
offer wheelchair patrons comparable lines of sight, as well as 
its failure to make wheelchair seating an integral part of the 
fIxed seating plan.220 The purpose for the remand concerns the 
issue of whether deference should be given to the DOJ's inter-
pretation of section 4.33.3.221 This issue arose for the fIrst time 
on appeal when the DOJ fIrst entered the case as amicus curiae 
at the request of the Court of Appeals during oral arguments.222 
Besides determining if the DOJ's interpretation is entitled to 
deference, the district court will need to factually analyze 
whether the defendant had reasonably sufficient notice of the 
interpretation to mandate compliance with the regulation.223 
Although the Second Circuit failed to render a decision re-
garding the district court's analysis, the order of the Second 
Circuit left little doubt as to which direction it was leaning. In 
addition to the issues of deference and notice, the Second Cir-
cuit outlined six specifIc factual issues for the district court to 
218 Meineker, 216 F. Supp. 2d at 18 n.4. In footnote 4, the court went into signifi-
cant detail noting the reason the comparability requirement of the regulation should 
encompass viewing angles. [d. The court stated the following: "This requirement is 
necessary to address the potential situation where a defendant has relegated wheel-
chair patrons to a portion of the theater that provided truly inferior viewing angles and 
limited or no seating for the general public--such as was the case at the start of this 
litigation where wheelchair patrons were relegated to the absolute worst seats at the 
very front of the theaters. It would defy common sense to describe the lines of sight 
afforded by such viewing positions as 'comparable' merely because they were unob-
structed." [d. 
219 Meineker v. Hoyts Cinemas Corp., No. 02-9034, 2003 WL 21510423, *26 (2nd 
Cir. July 1, 2003). 
220 [d. at 22. 
221 [d. at 24. The court notes that remand is necessary since the defendant ar-
gued that all the evidence cited to by the DOJ is outside the record on appeal, and that 
the defendant lacked reasonable notice of the DOJ's position. [d. at 24-25. The Second 
Circuit stated that these arguments require a fact finding by the district court. [d. at 
25. 
222 [d .. at 24. Besides the DOJ, the Second Circuit also requested letter briefs 
addressing the issue of deference to and notice of the DOJ's interpretation of § 4.33.3 
from the National Association of Theater Owners, and from the defendant. [d. at 25. 
223 [d. at 25. 
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determine on remand.224 After almost each one, the court pro-
vided a footnote in which it pointed the district court in the ap-
propriate direction, and practically gave them the answers to 
the factual questions in which they were assigned.225 Taken 
together, the footnotes state that the defendant and the de-
fense's architect endorsed the SMPTE Engineering Guidelines 
(maintained as an appropriate industry standard by the court), 
which described levels of physical discomfort suffered by view-
ers based on vertical viewing angles.226 Given the court of ap-
peal's deference to the SMPTE guidelines, it is highly likely 
that they want to find in favor of the plaintiffs in this case, and 
thereby bring the Second Circuit into accord with the Ninth 
Circuit. Only time will tell whether this prediction will become 
a reality. 
V. CONCLUSION 
The Ninth Circuit's decision in Regal reaffirmed the 
strength of the ADA and its purpose. After all, holding that 
"lines of sight comparable" encompass a viewing-angle re-
quirement is not only reasonable in light of common sense, but 
is in accord with the general mandate of the ADA that "[n]o 
individual shall be discriminated against on the basis of dis-
ability in the full and equal enjoyment of ... any place of public 
accommodation. "227 Wheelchair-bound moviegoers forced to sit 
in the front row of a movie theater lack the opportunity to gain 
the full and equal enjoyment of the movie- watching experience 
as compared with the general public. The Ninth Circuit in Re-
gal recognized this injustice and remedied it. 
22. [d. The issues were the following: "(1) Hoyts's notice of, and intent to comply 
with, the requirements of the ADA at the time of construction or renovation of the 
Crossgates theaters; (2) Hoyts's position in previous legal communications (submitted 
to administrative or judicial entities) regarding lines of sight; (3) the knowledge of 
Hoyts's architect at the time of construction or renovation of these facilities, including 
his understanding of lines of sight; (4) the understanding of Hoyts's officials of the 
meaning oflines of sight; (5) the industry's understanding of the terms used in § 4.33.3, 
including 'comparable lines of sight' at the time of construction or renovation of these 
facilities; and (6) customer seating preference data." [d. 
225 [d. at 25 n.6-1O. 
226 [d. at 25 n. 7-10. 
227 42 U.S.C. § 12182(a) (2000). 
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In the Regal case, a petition for certiorari to the United 
States Supreme Court was filed on October 27,2003.228 In light 
of the circuit split, it is likely that Regal will be heard by the 
United States Supreme Court.229 That aside, the Regal decision 
has dealt the first blow to the disability discrimination prac-
ticed in a majority of stadium-style theaters around the nation. 
It is hoped it will not be the last. 
JOSHUA D. WATTS' 
228 Regal Cinemas II, 339 F.3d 1126, petition for cert. filed, 72 U.S.L.W. 3310 
(U.S. Oct. 27, 2003) (No. 03-641). 
229 David Watson, Ninth Circuit Rules: Movie Theaters May Not Relegate Wheel-
chair Patrons to Front, Metropolitan News-Enterprise, available at 
http://www.metnews.com/articles/oreg081403.htm (last visited Feb. 15,2004). Lawyer 
Greg Hurley of Kutak Rock in Irvine, CA expressed this view. Id. Hurley filed an 
amicus brief in the case on behalf of the National Association of Theater Owners. Id. 
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